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Against this background, the most pressing issue in the euro area is to raise production to the level of potential output, i.e. to close the output gap. This requires demand-side policies. As ECB President Mario Draghi recently put it, "Demand side policies are not only justifi ed by the signifi cant cyclical component in unemployment. They are also relevant because, given prevailing uncertainty, they help insure against the risk that a weak economy is contributing to hysteresis effects."
2 Closing the output gap is necessary to alleviate the hardship of unemployment, increase the standard of living, reduce economic and political instability, and lower the debt ratio of both the private and the public sector.
Raising aggregate demand is all the more important as core infl ation and infl ation expecta tions have declined to low levels, with direct negative effects on the economy and on the role of the ECB's infl ation target as an economic stability anchor (see Figure 1 ). Despite some blunders and sluggish ness, the ECB has been very active in stabilising demand: by decreasing interest rates and increas ing liquidity, intervening in bond markets, and bolstering confi dence. In contrast, fi scal policy, spooked by fi nancial markets, has tended to depress demand through austerity. As a result, the euro area economy has by and large stagnated, and until recently, public debt ratios continued to rise as GDP declined and public expenditure rose in response to the faltering economy.
With interest rates near zero, mone tary policy has few options left. Furthermore, monetary policy only indirectly affects consumption and investment. In the current situation, it would be more effective to increase aggregate demand directly. Fiscal multipliers can be expected to be in a higher range, especially in the countries hardest hit by the crisis.
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Because of the self-imposed restrictions on euro area fi scal policies and concerns over increasing fi scal defi cits, some economists are calling for expanding the role of monetary policy to areas hitherto defi ned as fi scal, such as retiring public debt 4 and directly fi nancing public investment. 5 3 S. G e c h e r t , A. H u g h e s H a l l e t t , A. R a n n e n b e r g : Fiscal This article argues that neither monetary debt retirement nor monetary fi nancing of EU investment are a free lunch. They come at the cost of fudging the line between monetary and fi scal policy. All monetary policy measures inevitably impact on government fi nances; whether monetary policy actions cross the line depends on the underlying motivation of the action.
Monetary fi nancing -what it is and what it is not
History is littered with examples of governments using the central bank to fi nance public expenditure when they were unable or unwilling to raise the money on capital markets or by increasing taxes. More often than not, the result was spiralling infl ation as too much money chased too few goods. In recent history, Germany twice experienced a complete erosion of its money system. In 1923 the direct effect of monetary fi nancing was dwarfed by a subsequent loss of confi dence that led to a sharp increase in the velocity of money; hyperinfl ation completely wiped out savings, and a new currency was introduced at a ratio of 1 trillion to one. During and after WWII, price controls and rationing prevented open infl ation, but they also caused a shortage of goods and thriving black market activity. To restore monetary order, a monetary reform was carried out in 1948 that cancelled out 90 per cent of credits and savings.
The prohibition of central bank fi nancing of public entities was written into central bank statutes to prevent similar abuses of the central banks' ability to print money. Article 123 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) states that the Eurosystem may not grant public entities any type of credit facility or purchase debt instruments directly from them. 6 In addition, the ECB "shall be independent in the exercise of its powers and in the management of its fi nances" and is given "the primary objective … to maintain price stability". 7 The prohibition of monetary fi nancing is neither necessary nor suffi cient to ensure price stability. Its purpose is to protect the central bank's independence and its ability to maintain price stability, which could be undermined if governments had direct access to central bank fi nancing. Given the complexity of the issue, the spirit, not the letter, of the law is paramount. Secondary market purchases carried out with the objective of circumventing the prohibition of monetary fi nancing would be a violation. 8 
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European Central Bank point of view. In a nutshell, whether a given monetary policy operation constitutes monetary fi nancing of governments in the sense of Article 123 TFEU depends not on the effect the operation has on the fi nancing costs of governments but rather on its underlying objective.
Direct central bank fi nancing
Two recent proposals for overcoming the euro crisis make the case for monetary fi nancing of the public sector. Whereas Watt proposes that the ECB directly fi nance investment, 11 Pâris and Wyplosz argue that public debt may be effectively restructured by burying parts of it in the balance sheets of the Eurosystem, i.e. those of the ECB and the euro area national central banks.
12 Both proposals involve placing the ECB at the centre of matters generally considered to be fi scal in order to circumvent existing fi scal and political restrictions. Watt, furthermore, suggests that monetary fi nancing of investment in the current economic environment implies that there is no cost to such fi nancing.
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Monetary fi nancing of EU investment: a free lunch?
In Watt's proposal, the European Investment Bank (EIB) fi nances public invest ment projects in the euro area with newly issued EIB bonds which the ECB promises to purchase.
14 Because of this ex ante guarantee, 15 interest rates are expected to remain low and the EIB is expected to maintain its AAA rating despite markedly increasing its bond issue -by €250 billion in the fi rst year and €750 billion in all. Currently, the volume of EIB debt securities is €406 billion and the volume of EIB loans is €428 billion, thus implying increases of 185 per cent and 175 per cent respectively. 16 The proposal endeavours to show that such an increase in credit-fi nanced investment is possible without an increase in debt for a period of ten years and, in one version, at no cost at all.
11 A. W a t t , op. cit. 12 P. P â r i s , C. W y p l o s z , op. cit. 13 "…for a limited time public investment can be fi nanced costlessly through the issue of base money. Indeed, such investment is not just a free lunch, it is a meal that diners are being paid to eat." A. Watt, op. cit. p. 20. 14 The proposal's key feature of ECB-backed EIB bonds is also found in Watt's objective is to raise public investment as a means of bolstering growth. Given economic slack in the euro area, this is a reasonable suggestion, especially as monetary policy rates have reached their lower bound. The problem Watt attempts to tackle is the funding of these investments given institutional fi scal constraints and the reluctance of even those countries with obvious fi scal space to increase their debt. The issue of fi nancing is currently all the more diffi cult as the positive effects of increased investment would be largest in the countries hit worst by the crisis but least able to generate the necessary fi nancial means. Given these diffi culties, Watt puts forth a funding method which purportedly generates neither new debt nor interest payments. The only worry of policy makers in this proposal is to spend the money in accordance with the wishes of the people they represent.
The main fl aw in the argument is that, contrary to Watt's assertion, debt does not disappear when shifted to the central bank. Watt is simply wrong when he argues that the claim that debt cannot disappear "confuses a central bank with a commercial bank". 17 The fact that a central bank, unlike commercial banks, can absorb these losses and operate effectively even with negative capital in no way implies that the losses are not "real".
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Bonds purchased by the Eurosystem lengthen its balance sheet (see Table 1 ). Position 7 on the asset side increases at the same time as deposits (position 2) or banknotes in circulation (position 1) increase on the liabilities side. If these assets become worthless -for example, as a result of being transformed into perpetual zero-interest bonds -capital and reserves (position 12) absorb this loss. 19 For example, if EIB bonds worth €750 billion become worthless, position 12 would decline from the current €96 billion to -€654 billion.
The ECB's current asset purchase programme does not change this link in the slightest. The ECB has decided to purchase government bonds, other public bonds and cov-17 A. Wa t t , op. cit., p. 19. 18 Watt's line of argument is echoed in iAGS, op. cit., pp. 128-129: "A more radical proposal -although in fact it is much less so than it might appear -would be to extend the central bank holding period to 'for ever', in essence removing the need for countries to repay the debt to the central bank. … The debt might just as well be extinguished. There is no real 'loss' to the central bank in doing so." 19 The Eurosystem's revaluation accounts cannot be used to absorb such losses. Their purpose is to refl ect unrealised gains resulting from an increase in the market value of fi nancial assets and provide a buffer in case of a decrease in the market value. 20 This only means that the ECB does in fact wish to increase the liquidity available to banks. If this were not the case, but the ECB were nonetheless required to purchase EIB bonds, it would have to reabsorb the liquidity it created when purchasing the bonds by issuing debt certifi cates in the same amount (position 4). Irrespective of whether deposits, banknotes or issued debt certifi cates on the liability side are the counterpart of the EIB bonds on the asset side, if the EIB bonds become worthless, capital and reserves are reduced by the same amount.
The no-cost argument carries no more weight when applied to the suspension of interest payments on newly issued EIB bonds (for a period of ten years). Firstly, the fi scal position remains the same, whether investment is fi nanced regularly by issuing government bonds or irregularly through EIB-ECB monetary fi nancing. In the former case, governments pay interest, while in the latter, the central bank profi ts transferred to the governments are lower by the amount of interest not earned on EIB bonds. Expenditure is higher in the fi rst case, receipts are lower in the second, but the fi scal balance is unaffected. The only benefi t of monetary fi nancing -always assuming that the ECB does not throw its infl ation target overboard -would be to construct the new debt in such a way that would make it "disappear" or at least not be counted towards the debt criterion of the EU fi scal compact. As discussed above, debt does not disappear by shifting it to the central bank. The question that remains is whether one can hide the new debt from Eurostat by issuing EIB bonds which the ECB subsequently buys. This appears highly unlikely. The EIB would be disbursing funds -assets on its balance sheet balanced by bonds issued on the liabilities side -which do not appear as liabilities on any fi nancial account. Someone is sure to notice, even if they missed the process of getting the proposal approved by various political bodies and the consent of the ECB.
It follows that Watt's trouser pockets analogy misses the point on two counts: Firstly, fi nancing investment in the euro area involves the creation of new debt, whether held by the government or the Eurosystem; the pocket analogy would apply, at best, in the case of shifting existing debt. 22 Secondly, Watt misses the crucial point that fi scal authorities and mone tary authorities have different objectives. A central bank that is given the job of "extin guishing" debt or fi nanc- European Central Bank ing public investment is likely to incur a confl ict of interest. This potential confl ict of interest is moreover a logical consequence of Watt's proposal, because its raison d'être is the lack of political will to fi nance and redistribute through regular channels. Wren-Lewis rightly commented on the recent proliferation of helicopter money proposals as follows:
The macroeconomist in me wants to complain: as I have said in the past, helicopter money is either a plea for fi scal expansion -which is good, but why not call it that -or a policy for above target future infl ation, which may also be good but why not call it that too? 23
Watt's proposal is, fi rstly, a plea for fi scal expansion that, secondly, purports to show that it can be done at no cost and without increasing the public debt level, and thirdly, calls in question the infl ation target of the ECB. The monetary fi nancing is supposed to continue even when infl ation overshoots the ECB target of about 1.9 per cent: "For instance central bank purchases could be wound down to zero over a six month period after the core infl ation rate in the euro area has exceeded 2.5% for three consecutive months." 24 In the earlier version of the paper, the Eurosystem is to continue the purchases of EIB bonds until the entire €750 billion sum has been used for public investment, which "would be non-infl ationary as private-sector liquidity would be absorbed". 25 Given that lending to euro area credit institutions currently stands at €517 billion, this would amount to a complete redesign of monetary policy operations. There may be good reasons for such a change, but fi nancing current public expenditure is not among them.
Burying public debt in the Eurosystem's balance sheet Unlike Watt, Pâris and Wyplosz do not claim that debt disappears once shifted to the Eurosystem; they merely hold that such a transfer would be a politically accept able and effective way of restructuring. 26 The authors propose that the ECB buy a certain portion of euro area government bonds and transform these into interest-free perpetual bonds to remain on its balance sheet. of the Euro system. 27 The current plan, which they dub PADRE (Politically Acceptable Debt Restructuring in the Eurozone), abandons the idea of large-scale redistribution within the euro area and instead recommends halving euro area sovereign debt by transferring it to the Euosystem's balance sheet. According to the authors, "the fi nancing is simple": Each country's debt is reduced according to its ECB capital share, and each country pays for its own debt reduction because ECB seignorage is paid out in accordance to the capital share, and these profi ts will be lower "over the indefi nite future."
28 Future earnings are thus securitised and shelved at the ECB.
For the sake of brevity, I focus on only two points -fi rst, the claim that such a scheme does not involve the monetisation of debt, and second, that the drastic increase in the balance sheet of the Eurosystem is irrelevant for the effectiveness of monetary policy.
In the fi rst step, the scheme necessarily involves a monetisation of public debt, because the Eurosys tem can only buy the existing government debt with the means of payment it creates, i.e. deposits of banks and currency in circulation. After all, this ability of the Eurosystem to create the means of payment is the key reason for involving the Eurosystem in the fi rst place. Pâris and Wyplosz argue that the plan does not involve monetisation because the Eurosystem would issue debt certifi cates (position 4 under liabilities in Table 1 ) to absorb the newly created liquidity. 29 It may be semantics to argue that sterilised monetisation is nonetheless monetisation; the more important point, however, is that the PADRE plan unquestionably involves monetary fi nancing as outlined above. Table 2 shows the reduction in the debt ratios of individual countries according to the PADRE plan and the effect on the Eurosystem's balance sheet. Whereas the initial proposal in 2013 was more manageable in size (€1.2 trillion) but involved large-scale redistribution within the euro area that was not in line with the prevailing objectives of policy makers, the current proposal entails a transfer of such magnitude that it is likely to impair the effectiveness of monetary policy. A central bank's credibility hinges on its ability to ensure the stable value of its currency. In the event of a loss of confi dence in the currency by fi nancial 27 "Suppose all the other Eurozone countries forgive a quarter of the debts of Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Italy, Spain and France. This represents a write-down for 'forgiven' countries' debt that amounts to about €1200 billion. That is about 30% of the 'forgiving' countries' GDPs." See P. P â r i s , C. W y p l o s z : To end the Eurozone crisis … , op. cit. 28 P. P â r i s , C. W y p l o s z : The PADRE plan … , op. cit. European Central Bank markets, the central bank has to be ready to intervene on foreign exchange markets to prevent strong depreciation, for example. A fi nancially strong central bank can easily obtain a credit line from other central banks. However, if the ECB is already saddled with worthless assets amounting to 47 per cent of the euro area GDP and twothirds of its total assets, the credibility of announcing that it will defend a given exchange rate is not likely to be high. The same goes for interventions in domestic markets. Our monetary system is based on fi at money not backed by gold or other assets. However, the acceptance of the euro as a reliable store of value cannot be decreed. It rests on the credibility of the central bank and its ability to regain that credibility should it falter.
In addition to the issues revolving around monetisation and central bank credibility, a third questionable feature of the plan involves the prospect of eventually "retiring" the debt using future seignorage. The Eurosystem would be unlikely to generate any profi ts for a long time if the PADRE plan is implemented. Two-thirds of its assets would not earn any interest, whereas interest would still be due on its liabilities, save for banknotes. Banknotes would account for less than one-sixth of total liabilities, being dwarfed by the debt certifi cates issued to absorb the liquidity generated by government bond purchases worth €4.8 trillion. In the absence of other changes to the refi nancing operations, the Eurosystem would therefore likely operate not only with negative capital but also with operational losses. Pâris and Wyplosz concede that the Eurosystem would sustain substantial operational losses for a period of more than fi ve decades.
Conclusion
Monetary fi nancing of public investment is not a free lunch, as contended by Watt. Although EIB-ECB fi nancing would mean that governments do not pay interest on the funds used for public investment, the Eurosystem would not earn interest on the corresponding assets, thus generating less profi t than in the case of standard quantitative easing. Provided the ECB pursues its infl ation target, the impact on the fi scal budget is the same whether public investment is fi nanced regularly or by the central bank.
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Concerning the impact on public debt ratios, there is the slim chance that the factual increase in public debt can be hidden from the watchful eye of Eurostat and the EU Commission by using the EIB-ECB construction. This, however, would imply that the euro area governments agree to circumvent the rules which they themselves laid down rather than using the room for manoeuver that 30 See footnote 21.
these rules entail. 31 Monetary fi nancing of public investment bears not only the same costs as regular fi nancing but the further cost of fudging the line between monetary and fi scal policy and, in addition, weakening the effectiveness of monetary policy by saddling the Eurosystem with €750 billion of non-interest-bearing assets.
The balance sheet effect is even greater in the case of the PADRE plan. 32 This proposal essentially amounts to a debt redemption fund, with the key difference that the "excessive" debt is held by the central banks and future seignorage is earmarked for debt servicing. 33 Watt as well as Pâris and Wyplosz use the Eurosystem to hide the implications of a recommended policy action in the hope of making it politically more acceptable. For a whole slew of reasons -not least stability, transparency and democratic accountability -central banks and policy The euro area is currently faced with the problem of large output gaps, high uncertainty, low growth and high debt ratios. In all euro area countries, with the possible exception of Greece, the key challenge is not to restructure debt but to close the output gap and steer the countries onto a stable growth path. As GDP increases, debt ratios decline. Economic growth is the main mechanism through which public debt ratios will decline -whether hidden in the Eurosystem's balance sheet or not.
Fiscal policy is likely to be more effective than monetary policy in the current low-interest environment. However, there is absolutely no need to violate Article 123 of the Lisbon Treaty or the budgetary authority of national parliaments in order to increase public investment. Given the very low level of government bond yields (Figure 2) , it is primarily the interpretation of the fi scal rules that prevents regular fi nancing of public investment. 35 Since the euro area is obviously in an unexpected adverse economic situation -GDP forecasts are being repeatedly revised downward, and infl ation expectations are declining -fi scal defi cits could be increased even in those countries that currently are said not to have any fi scal space. To achieve fi nancing at the euro area level, eurobonds or eurobills could be issued. 36 These would constitute high-quality bonds which the ECB can use for QE. But unlike the EIB bonds proposed by Watt, they would not be high quality bonds simply because the ECB uses them for QE. And it would be clear to all what the costs are and who bears them. "Future generations will not understand why [euroarea] governments did not invest in productive assets that improve their welfare, while these governments could do so at historically low fi nancing costs". 37 In order to fortify the euro area against fi nancial shocks in the future and reduce the current level of uncertainty, the ECB needs to be able to act as an effective backstop for public debt. 38 Saddling the ECB with non-interest bearing debt would not only weaken the central bank in general but also its ability to perform this role. 39 38 See P. D e G r a u w e : Design Failures in the Eurozone -can they be fi xed?, European Economy, Economic Papers 491, Brussels, April 2013. This important role was recently also emphasised by ECB President Draghi: "Turning to fi scal policy, since 2010 the euro area has suffered from fi scal policy being less available and effective, especially compared with other large advanced economies. This is not so much a consequence of high initial debt ratios -public debt is in aggregate not higher in the euro area than in the US or Japan. It refl ects the fact that the central bank in those countries could act and has acted as a backstop for government funding. This is an important reason why markets spared their fi scal authorities the loss of confidence that constrained many euro area governments' market access. This has in turn allowed fi scal consolidation in the US and Japan to be more backloaded." See M. D r a g h i , op. cit. 39 In a monetary union, this important role of the central bank presupposes that the sovereign bonds of member states are safe assets and that institutional regulations are in place that promote fi scal sustainability and prevent sovereign defaults. During the past several years, rather than fortifying the trust in euro area government debt as reliable stores of value, governments have undermined it by, for example, explicitly not excluding the possibility of default and including collec- 
